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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Le plus connu des corpus de données sur le temps de travail au cours du long dix-neuvième 
siècle, réuni par Angus Maddison, est sérieusement erroné, car il présume que tous les pays 
avaient les mêmes heures de travail que celles des Britanniques. Cet article présente de nouvelles 
mesures du temps de travail pour l’Europe, l’Amérique du Nord et l’Australie, entre 1870 et 
1900. À l’exception de la Grande-Bretagne et de l’Australie, les heures de travail étaient très 
longues, avec des rythmes de décroissance différents selon les pays. La longueur de la semaine 
de travail était inversement proportionnelle au niveau de revenu, mais avec une légère tendance 
convergente ou un rattrapage tel que la théorie le prévoyait. Les routines de travail et les lois 
régissant les heures de travail expliquent certaines différences, mais les particularités sectorielles 
vont dans le sens opposé. Au sein des industries concurrentielles, comme les textiles, il y avait 
un nivellement par le bas. Comme les longues heures de travail constituaient un avantage 
compétitif, même le travailleur du textile au Lancashire a dû ajuster sa montre à l’heure italienne. 
 
Assembled by Angus Maddison, the most widely consulted data set on worktime in the long 
nineteenth century is seriously flawed, because it assumes all countries had British work hours. 
This paper constructs new measures of worktime in Europe, North America and Australia 
between 1870 and 1900. With the exception of Great Britain and Australia, work hours were 
very long. Trends in worktime varied across countries. The length of the workweek was inversely 
related to the level of income, but there was only a modest tendency toward convergence or 
catch-up as theory anticipates. National work routines and laws restricting working hours 
explain some of the divergence, but sectoral effects operated in the other direction. Competing-
goods industries, like textiles, saw a race to the bottom. Because long hours were a source of 
competitive advantage, even the Lancashire textile worker set his watch to Italian time. 
 
 
Mots clés : Mondialisation, commerce international, temps de travail, intégration 
économique. 
  
Keywords: Globalization, international trade, work hours, economic integration. 
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Introduction 
 
  Albert Rees, in his classic labor economics textbook, asserted that the decision to labor 72 
hour per week “in the early days of the industrial revolution” was neither implausible nor 
impractical. At very low real wages, “with habituation and a less intense pace of work, output 
could continue to rise with increases in the workweek well beyond any number of hours we could 
now regard as reasonable.”
1 But as wages and incomes rose, hours fell – a pattern, according to 
the ubiquitous belief among economists, that holds across space as well. “[T]here is strong 
empirical evidence that the optimal length of the workweek is negatively correlated with a 
nation’s level of income; that is, high-income countries have a shorter workweek than many low-
income countries.”
2  
The late nineteenth century is a puzzle for the standard view. Owing to increased 
international mobility of labor and the expansion of trade, real wages rose almost everywhere in 
the period. Work hours should have declined globally and converged – a type of race to the  
top – because developing countries grew more rapidly and caught up to richer ones. Extending 
this line reasoning, Hans-Joachim Voth argued that at comparable levels of income less 
developed countries in the late nineteenth century ought to have worked fewer hours than richer 
countries because of the gradual substitution of human capital for labor time.
3 But in the face of 
these forces, worktime measures for poorer and richer countries, across Old and New Worlds, 
hardly changed. For the UK, Robin Matthews, Charles Feinstein and J. C. Odling-Smee 
calculated 2,744 annual work hours in 1873, and 2,753 in 1913; for the US, Jeremy Atack, Fred 
Batemen and Robert Margo found that the working day in 1900 was not much shorter than in 
1880.
4 Across countries, higher income economies did not always work less than relatively poorer 
ones. In 1900 annual work hours in France stood at 3,000, about 300 more than in Italy, whose 
income per head was more than fifty percent less.
5 
  There are two sorts of explanations for these trends. The first is that international 
comparisons of worktime confront serious data problems. Annual measures of worktime are 
                                                       
1According to Rees (Economics of Work, p. 26), much of the empirical evidence usually cited to show the adverse 
effect of long hours on output comes from abnormally long hours in wartime. “These hours were worked by workers 
who were either accustomed to shorter hours or were new wartime recruits. They worked long hours at high money 
wages at a time when there was a severe shortage of goods.” In these circumstances, 54 hours may have been the 
maximum length of the workweek. But “this evidence is not inconsistent with an output maximizing figure of 60 or 
even 72 hours a week a century earlier.” See also Phelps Brown and Browne, “Hours of Work.” 
2 Brown, “Labor Standards,” p. 91. For a similar statement, see Voth, Time and Work, p. 255.  “…GDP per capita 
alone explains a high proportion of changes in time allocation.” 
3 Ibid., pp. 258-68. 
4 Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Growth, p. 566; Atack, Batemen, and Margo, “Productivity in 
Manufacturing,” p. 16. 
5 Decouflé and Svendsen, “Une histoire,” p. 65; Zemagani, History of Italy, chap. 6. The estimate for Italy assumes 
270 days of work per year and 10 hours per day.  2  
imprecise. Not only do standards of measurement vary across countries, but annual figures are 
composite estimates of approximations of the length of the workday and workweek, and the 
number of weeks worked per year. Errors in measurement are compounded because estimates of 
weekly hours are often based on a single sector of activity. The interplay of demand and supply 
provides the second type of explanation of the trend in hours. The long workday and year may 
have been the outcome of demand side pressure from employers to extend the time use of their 
capital investments. As for supply, workers may have been caught up in a second “industrious 
revolution.” With increased exposure to foreign trade, households may have been willing to 
supply more labor time and reduce household production to acquire new foreign goods. Despite 
these forces, there may have been a timing problem in matching wage and hour changes, thereby 
forestalling the movement to new equilibria that better reflected rising levels of personal income. 
M. A. Bienefeld argued that since hours are more difficult to adjust than wages worktime changes 
are infrequent, but when they do occur, they are often large and concentrated in single years.
6 
Thus, hour cuts were postponed in many countries until after the First World War..  
  This paper provides an empirical investigation of some of these issues. Exploiting a new 
international data set of working hours in Europe, North America and Australia, I examine the 
length of the workweek and year and the dispersion of work hours across countries and sectors. 
With the exception of Great Britain and Australia, work hours were very long in the period. The 
trend in worktime is more difficult to discern. The length of the workweek was, as theory 
anticipates, inversely related to the level of income, but there were offsetting influences. In certain 
countries and regions, like France and northern Europe, worktime showed little change; in others 
like Germany and Switzerland, there was a marked downward trend. National work routines, 
cultural practices, and protective legislation may explain some of these divergences. There were 
also sectoral effects. Corresponding to the trends in the prices of competing and non-competing 
goods Jeffrey Williamson and Kevin O’Rourke found in their study of globalization, average 
hours were less likely to decline – and more likely to converge – in those sectors, like textiles, 
which faced strong international pressures. The British, despite their preeminent position in the 
industry, adjusted their clock to Italian work practices. In these sectors, working hours were 
subject to a race to the bottom.
7 All told, national and international forces had often opposing 
effects on the length of the workday, and, as a result, across the New and Old World convergence 
of worktime was modest at best.  
 
                                                       
6 Bienefeld, Working Hours.  
7 O’Rourke and Williamson, “Globalization.”  3  
Working time across countries: old and new estimates 
 
As a preliminary step in estimating employment and productivity for a group of OECD 
countries, Angus Maddison, in a series of articles and books, assembled an international data set 
on worktime that can be taken as the point of reference for more recent estimates.
8 Table 1 
reproduces the hours per week series for 1870, 1900, and 1913 Maddison used as the basis for his 
calculations. Because of data limitations, he assumed that all countries had the same work hours 
as Britain until 1913, even Canada and the US. Maddison went on to write:  
 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding these [hours of work] rather arbitrary figures, we have 
assumed that the movement in working hours from 1870 to 1913 was the same in all our 
countries [Western Europe and North America]. This is probably a reasonable assumption.
9 
 
Columns 4 and 5 of the table give Maddison’s estimates for the number of weeks worked based 
on evidence from the interwar years. Maddison did not explain how the modest variation between 
countries was arrived at. To calculate annual measures, Maddison multiplied weekly hours and 
number of weeks worked, and then made some deductions for time loss. He did not specify the 
breakdown of days not at work into its standard components, illness, unemployment or stoppages. 
The deductions were the same for all countries and amounted to 7.1 percent in 1870, 4.5 percent 
in 1900, and 2.5 percent in 1913. The last three columns in the table reproduces the estimated 
annual hours series for 1870, 1900 and 1913. As anticipated, given its method of construction, 
Maddison’s series show conformity in worktime measures across countries.   
Maddison’s assumptions may have made little difference for his analysis of productivity 
growth (GDP per hour worked) over the long twentieth century from 1870 to 1998. But it is even 
more evident that his worktime measures before 1913 can be improved upon. In this paper, I draw 
on two unique sources that provide the building blocks for an international comparison of 
worktime during the early wave of globalization. The first source comprises the reports of the 
consular delegates to the British trade office beginning in the early 1870s. Even by this date, there 
was some unease expressed that shorter hours would make British industry uncompetitive, and to 
verify its concerns the Board of Trade had its representatives across the world collect data on 
working conditions and hours in order to isolate the sources of international competitiveness.
10  
                                                       
8 Maddison, Economic Growth, Phases of Development, “Growth and Slowdown”, Monitoring, World Economy.  
9 Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 225.  
10 UK PP 1870 LXVI, PP 1871 LXVIII, PP 1872 LXII. The consular reports were superseded by the Abstract of 
Foreign Labour Statistics and the Commission on Labour, Foreign Reports published occasionally before the First 
World War. PP 1899 XCII, PP 1901 LXXIII, PP 1906 CXIII, PP 1893-94 XXXIX.   4  
Table 2 summarizes worktime information from the reports for common day laborers. For 
Russia, the consular delegate observed: 
 
... [T]he number of festivals on which work is prohibited in all factories is 19, but in most cases 27 or 28 
festivals are kept as holidays during the year. Thus the average number of holidays, including Sunday is 
80 or even 100 days, so only 250 or 260 days are spent at work…. In Poland the number of working days 
is further reduced to 230 on an average, because in Russia religious festivals are observed according to 
the Julian calendar, while in Poland they are celebrated twice over, according to both the Gregorian and 




For the rest of Europe and the New World festival or holy days were less frequent, as illustrated 
by the increase in workdays after 1870 in Belgium, France and Italy. Still there existed a large 
difference in workdays between north and south, the gap between Italy and the Netherlands was 
about three weeks, and the New World had fewer days off than the Old. Evidently, national work 
routines mattered into the late nineteenth century. The overall average was about 300 days, and 
excluding Sunday work, this translates into about 49 weeks of work per year. 
  The second source I have relied upon gives detailed information on work hours per week. 
The US Department of Labor (1900), under the supervision of Carroll Wright, collected data on 
weekly work hours for the period 1850 to 1899 for a group of industrializing and industrialized 
countries.
12 The Department consulted over 700 sources on non-agricultural work hours, mainly 
published and unpublished government accounts. Covering a long time span, the report combines 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and, in this regard, is more reliable than 
series that rely on observations of a small sample of businesses, usually textile mills or mines, for 
shorter periods. The report distinguished as well between women’s and men’s work hours. 
Because of data limitations for the early years, I restrict myself to the period between 1870 and 
1899. Table 3 gives the relevant descriptive statistics. The Department’s survey is heavily 
weighted toward the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain. Each observation 
represents the average hours worked by one or a group of similar workers, such as male cotton 
spinners, in a specific firm. Where summer and winter hours were reported, I took the average of 
the two. Of the 5,000 or so European observations, about 55 percent are from Britain and 15 
percent from Germany and France. The survey’s breakdown by sector is roughly similar across 
countries (services account for between five to eight percent, and textile and manufacturing 
                                                       
11 PP 1893-94 XXXIX, Part II, p. 864. The figure for Russia in Table 2 is for 1870. 
12 US Department of Labor, Fifteenth Annual Report. The US data includes 1900; other countries until 1899. I have 
dropped the 1900 observations for the US.  5  
combined about 45-50 percent). The appendix contains definitions of the sectors, as well as a 
regional breakdown of the US data. 
  The workday was very long, about 12 or more hours in many sectors and countries since 
there was no Sunday work.
13 They were generally longer in services and textiles than in 
manufacturing and iron and steel. There is no discernible pattern to women’s work. Time trends 
are more difficult to detect because missing observations plague the data set. To get around this 
problem, Table 4 presents quinquennial averages. Some countries, like Germany and Switzerland 
exhibited a large decline in hours; others, like Belgium and Denmark, saw an initial rise, then a 
decline; finally, for a group of countries, including Canada and Italy, there was little or no trend in 
worktime. National work routines explain some of these patterns. In France, the trend was 
indeterminate, a result that meshes with the depictions of social historians. Up until the First 
World War, the workweek was haphazard and the notion of the weekend ill defined.
14 For 
developing countries catch-up – the race to the top – was laborious, since Britain, the European 
leader, was a moving target, its hours falling only slightly less than the Old World average. To be 
sure, this portrait is imperfect, because for certain countries observations tend to be concentrated 
in selected periods. A compounding problem with the survey is that sectors were not sampled 
evenly across sub-periods. I will attempt to correct for these problems in the next sections of the 
paper. That said, in the case of the Netherlands, a country which had a very long workweek, the 
number of observations is spread out equally, while for Belgium, the long work hours in 1880-84 
do not seem unrepresentative because of the relatively large number of observations in the sub-
period.   
  Independent sources confirm the results of Tables 3 and 4. The British, Canadian, Dutch, 
French, German and US series from the Department of Labor survey correspond closely with 
other, albeit scattered, estimates.
15 There are differences between the new figures and previous 
estimates for Belgium, Denmark and Italy.
16 In the case of Belgium, my series indicates shorter 
working hours than Scholliers found in his study of a single textile enterprise, but this is 
consistent with the general result of longer than average work hours in the textile sector. The 
                                                       
13 The consular reports confirm that these hours were net of meal and rest times. Even if rest time is excluded in these 
figures, there is a potential bias in the other direction. The Department’s report contains no mention of overtime 
hours. Contemporary sources indicate that at certain times of the year these may not have been negligible. Because of 
the possibility of opposing biases due to the exclusion of rest times and overtime, I have left the raw series 
unadjusted. For contemporary accounts, see: Cross, Quest for Time, pp. 67, 234; Gårdlund, Industrialismens, p. 312; 
Heikkinen, Labour and the Market, pp. 154-56; Kaplow, “Saint-Lundi”; Pollard, “Labour in Britain,” pp. 157-58; 
Rist, La réglementation légale, pp. 177-88; Rosenband, Papermaking, p. 108;  
14 To the French, the six-day work week was la semaine anglaise. Cross, Quest for Time, pp. 79-102. 
15 Great Britain: Bienefeld, Working Hours; Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Growth, pp. 64-70, 566; 
Canada: Altman, “New Estimates,” p. 361; France: Marchand and Thélot, Travail en France, p. 145; Germany: 
Hoffmann, Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft, pp. 213-14; Netherlands: Wintle, History of the Netherlands, p. 66; 
US: Atack and Bateman, “How Long was the Workday,” p. 139; Costa, “Wage and Length,” p. 158. 
16 Belgium: Scholliers, Wages, Manufacturers; Italy: Federico, L’Industria mondiale.  6  
average hours in Denmark is about one-half hour per day more longer than that reported by J. P. 
Christensen.
17 Still, as late as the 1890s, contemporaries reported that in Copenhagen “89 percent 
of all factories had a working day of ten-and-a-half hours or less, whereas in the provinces a large 
number of establishments visited worked 11 hours or more.”
18 My figure for Denmark at the end 
of the century is not far off the mark.  
 
Annual worktime and standard explanations 
 
There are several problems in calculating annual worktime measures from the data set, 
owing to its unbalanced nature over time and across sectors. Consider the sectoral balance. The 
number of hours worked per week in the first column of Table 3 is an unweighted average. The 
heavy representation of the textile sector does not correspond to its share of the labor force, about 
10 to 20 percent of paid workers many countries. In contrast, the share of services is 
underrepresented. Services, broadly defined, amounted to between 25 to 50 percent of the labor. 
But since work hours in services were in fact longer than those in textiles, reweighting the 
sectoral components would only increase the average length of the workweek.  
  Recognizing the data limitations, Table 5 collects information from the consular reports 
and the Department of Labor survey, and other sources, to estimate annual work hours for Old 
and New World countries. The number of days worked per year is taken from Table 2 and hours 
per week from Table 3.
19 Using information from the Department’s study of health insurance, I 
have deducted from the former series the number of day’s loss due to illness.
20 I have not made 
any deductions for average days loss due to unemployment or for work stoppages. Although some 
national series exist for these measures, further research is needed to make them comparable 
across countries. The resulting series in column 5, therefore, represents potential worktime. 
Again, independent sources verify my procedures. The figure for France is just slightly higher 
than the 3,045 hours calculated from a survey conducted by the Office du travail in 1891, while 
that for the US approximates the 3,200 hours calculated from recent studies.
21   
These new figures confirm the impression that a long work year was the rule in the in both the 
Old and New World. The exception was Australia, which must have appeared to a northern 
                                                       
17 Christensen, Lønudviklingen inden, p. 71.  
18 UK PP 1893-94 XXXIX, Part II, p. 780. Workdays of 12 hours were reported for Norway and Sweden in the 
1890s. Ibid., pp. 778-79.  
19 Compared to Maddison’s approximations, this amounted to slightly fewer days of work per year and more days 
lost. 
20 US Department of Labor, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, and Workmen’s Compensation Laws. I would like to 
thank John Murray for recommending this source.  
21 Decouflé and Svendsen, “Une histoire.” For the US, Atack, Batemen, and Margo (“Productivity in 
Manufacturing”) reported 309 days of work and 60.5 hours per week. Rosenbloom (“Male Labour Supply”) assumed 
306 days of work.   7  
European laborer as a worker paradise. There was an 800 hours difference between Australia and 
the Netherlands. This is comparable to the gap in 1998 between Mexico, which had perhaps the 
longest work year among developing countries, and the Netherlands, which had the shortest work 
year in the club of advanced economies.
22 Columns 6 and 7 calculate annual work hours at the 
beginning and end of the period using data from Table 4 and assuming the same workweek and 
days of work as in column 5. Evidence of convergence is mixed. The gap between the US and 
Denmark narrowed by 180 hours over the thirty year period; but the overall difference between 
New and Old World hours fell by only 50 hours, while the standard deviation and the coefficient 
of variation for Old World (European) countries actually increases.
23  
The differences in work hours affected the relative standards of living of countries. In the 
Appendix, I calculate GDP per capita adjusted for changes in leisure. This expanded indicator of 
well being reveals a larger gap between Britain and elsewhere than conventional measures of 
income have found. The new annual numbers also have implications for standard readings of 
international productivity levels and changes. Based on Maddison’s numbers, GDP per worker 
hour converged between 1870 and 1914. Recall, however, that Maddison assumed the same hours 
across countries in his data set. Using the revised numbers, the Appendix shows that productivity 
levels in Britain were higher and the gap between it and its rivals much larger.  
The general portrait of work hours from the tables raises some doubts with conventional 
explanations of the length of the workday. The common demand side argument is that the 
workday was long because employers sought to extend the utilization of their fixed capital 
investments.
24 But the sectoral breakdown indicates that in all countries hours were in fact shorter 
in capital-intensive sectors, like construction and mining and iron and steel, than in services and 
manufacturing. As for supply, the annual measures cast some doubt on the textbook view that as 
the wage rises, the income effect dominates the substitution effect. Voth found that English 
laborer spent roughly 3,300 hours at work in 1830, close to the worktime of a Dane in 1870.
25 
Denmark’s per capita income in the latter year was nearly $2,000, around the level of British 
income in 1830.
26 Over time, as income levels increased – average GDP per capita increased by 
50 per cent from 1870 to 1900 for the group of countries in this paper – work hours ought to have 
                                                       
22 The last column of Table 5 gives 1998 annual hours. The decline of work hours over the last century, much of 
which took place between 1920 and 1950, was as striking as it was universal. For an analysis, see, Crafts, “Human 
Development Index.” 
23 The coefficient of variation tests for sigma-convergence. I have also tested for beta-convergence in regressions with 
annual work hours in 1870 and the rate of change in worktime form 1870 to 1899 as dependent and independent 
variables. For both Europe and all countries, the regressions performed poorly. These measures of convergence give 
only a partial view of the dispersion of worker welfare. Presumably, workers were concerned with the combination of 
hours supplied and wages earned. The Department’s report gave evidence of wages along with hours and in a 
companion article I examine the two together.  
24 For this view, see Clark, “Factory Discipline.” 
25 Voth, Time and Work, p. 258. 
26 All GDP per capita figures in 1990 international dollars. Source: Maddison, Monitoring, and World Economy.   8  
fallen. Figure 1 traces the correspondence between worktime and income for all countries in our 
sample, combining information for 1870 and 1899. The overall relationship is downward as 
expected, although it is barely significant. Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of regressing 
hours on GDP per capita, with population as a control variable.
27 GDP per capita is significant 
only when the New World countries are included in the sample (regression 1). European countries 
seem to have had their own dynamic. Undoubtedly, these results suffer because of the small 
sample size and from the problems inherent in calculating annual hours. The results may indicate 
as well that there are variables omitted. In the next section, I treat these problems in more detail.   
In Figure 1, the Netherlands in 1899 is a clear outlier.
28 Dutch hours actually rose over the 
period even as income levels increased by a third. Sui generis, the Dutch case merits further 
explanation because it resembles the relation between work hours and consumption, the 
industrious revolution, Jan de Vries found for an earlier period.
29 Real wages in the Netherlands 
were depressed in the first half of the nineteenth century, but relative to labor costs of its 
continental neighbors, they proved to be an obstacle to prolonged growth. After 1870 or so, the 
long-term decline in prices of grain imports caused a steady rise in real wages. Calorie intake 
increased from about 2,000 units in 1870 to nearly 2,800 by the First World War – about 300 
units more than the British consumed at the time –, and there is little evidence that the condition 
of the Dutch working class deteriorated in the period.
30 The increase in labor input is consistent 
with this picture.
31 Sustained by higher food intake, workers supplied more hours on the job.  
Voth has attempted to modify the basic relation between income and hours. He argued that the 
transfer of technology from the industrial leader to developing countries, and the accumulation of 
human capital, reduced the demand for labor input. Britain’s long work hours between 1780 and 
1830 were an exception, the penalty of being an early industrializer. Using Maddison’s data for 
OECD countries, 1870 to 1987, Voth reported a negative and significant relation between the gap 
in GDP per capita, the difference in income between the leader and that of other countries, and 
annual worktime. But the last two columns of the table show that Voth’s prediction does not 
stand up for 1870-99, either for the entire sample or for European countries only.  
In sum, the worktime measures from the original sources I have consulted indicate that 
work hours were very long in European countries in the last three decades of the nineteenth 
century, much longer that it would be expected given their levels of income. Because hours did 
                                                       
27 The regression models follow Voth, Time and Work, pp. 253-68. A log specification does not change the results in 
any significant way.  
28 This paragraph is based on Wintle, History of the Netherlands, and van Zanden “Industrialization.” 
29 de Vries, “Industrial Revolution.” 
30 Wintle, History of the Netherlands, p. 65; Clark, Huberman, and Lindert, “British Food Supply,” 
p. 223. 
31 The increase in labor input corroborates Rees’ claim (footnote 1 above) on workers’ potential to supply very long 
hours of labor, at least over a short period, without detriment to productivity or welfare.   9  
not always move in the opposite direction to income, convergence in worktime between Europe 
and the New World was slow. In the next section of the paper I explore in detail whether these 
results hold when I control for country and sector.   
 
Trends in worktime: national routines and international pressures 
 
Even if workers desired to reduce hours as their incomes rose, they did not necessarily 
have the capacity to do so over the short term. In general, individual workers have only partial 
recourse to negotiate their work hours, which are a type of public good fixed by collective 
decision making.
32 In the absence of unions, workers were easily divisible and employers got their 
way in extending the length of the workday. Beinefeld used this type of reasoning to explain why 
British hours did not fall continuously as incomes rose in the late century. An  alternative was 
government intervention. In Switzerland, working hours fell abruptly in the mid 1870s, and the 
decline coincided with new laws that prohibited night work of adolescents, restricted women’s 
work, and that fixed the length of the workday of all workers at 11 hours. The Swiss were way 
ahead of the rest of Europe. It was only in the late 1890s that most countries had limitations on 
night work for women and children, and a smaller group had fixed the length of the workday of 
women at 11 hours.
33 Elsewhere in Europe, enfeebled by their limited representation in national 
assemblies and parliaments, workers’ fate was in the hands of social reformers and liberals. But 
although there was near unanimity on setting standards for the working conditions of children, 
and to some extent women, men’s hours proved more contentious. To some, men ought to have 
the freedom to contract their work as they saw fit, and anyway evidence that long hours hampered 
productivity was mixed. Restricitng the workday reduced employment because it raised labor 
costs. The workday would fall with improvements in productivity. Others believed that fixing the 
workday was in everyone’s best interest with few ramifications on productivity and income.  
Often inconclusive, these debates were more successful in shedding light on what 
contemporaries perceived to be the determinants of national and global trends in worktime. 
Typical was the view of Charles Rist, the French economist and social reformer, who divided the 
French economy into two sectors: a sector composed of industries producing for the home market 
and, a second, comprised of firms facing stiff international competition.
34 In the non-tradeable 
goods sector, Rist observed, hours were set by a combination of social factors, such as local and 
regional work routines, and economic forces, like productivity and income improvements. They 
could be long or short depending on the relative importance of these factors. The state could limit 
                                                       
32 On hours as a public good, see Huberman, Escape from the Market, pp. 123-24; Shiells, “Collective Choice.” 
33 For countries and dates of introduction of factory legislation, see Huberman and Lewchuk, “European Economic 
Integration.” For Switzerland, see Follows, International Labour.  
34 Rist, La réglementation légale.  10  
the workday of firms in these industries without affecting the external balance. But Rist did not 
advise restrictions in the export or competing-goods sector. Limiting the workday to 10 hours 
would make the French silk industry uncompetitive with that of Italy, and the hexagon’s ribbon 
and lace manufacturers suffer at the expense of the Swiss and Germans.  
  To fix ideas, consider that a combination of economic, and country specific and industry 
(or sectoral) factors determine work hours. I am interested in the effect of the addition of country 
and industry factors to the simple specification underlying Table 6 in which income determines 
hours only. Country factors include long-standing work routines and legal restrictions on the 
workday. Industries can arranged by their degree of international exposure. The textile sector 
faced the highest degree of international competition, followed by manufacturing, iron and steel, 
mining and construction, and services.
35 In light of Rist’s classification, two types of regimes or 
spheres coexisted. In non-competing sectors national routines dominated, hours were variable 
across countries owing to the mix of legal and social factors, and convergence was weak. In the 
other, industries faced stronger international competition, hours were long and there was a 
tendency to convergence because of the potential of a race to the bottom. The balance of forces 
between country and sectoral factors would explain the weak results regarding convergence 
reported in the previous section. 
Table 7 presents tests of these propositions using all the observations on weekly work 
hours from the survey and gets around the aggregation problems inherent in constructing annual 
measures of work time. The first regression reports that the length of the work week was in fact 
negatively related to GDP per capita, as theory would expect.
36 Regression two adds country 
factors, with Great Britain as the baseline case. An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the addition 
of country factors had no effect on work hours. Holding income levels constant, there were 
significant differences between countries. Britain was comparable only with Ireland and Canada, 
and most pair wise comparisons reject the null hypothesis of no difference between countries.
37 
Although extreme, the Belgian case – of the 12 pair wise comparisons the hypothesis of no 
difference is rejected in all cases – is instructive. Workers lacked a collective voice and, as a 
result, Belgian employers had the upper hand, refusing any concession on working conditions. 
Labor legislation of any note had to wait until the early twentieth century when workers gained a 
legitimate presence with the introduction of proportional representation in the national assembly.   
                                                       
35 As defined (see Appendix), iron and steel products and manufacturing goods were exported, but mainly to niche 
markets. Mining and construction output was not traded, except for coal. 
36 So as not to overwhelm the data set, a 10 percent random sample (N = 1570, selected according to the SPSS 
procedure) of US observations was used in the panel regressions of Table 7. The mean (s.d.) of the sample is 60.31 
(5.6). The Swedish and Danish observations were combined in Scandinavia. In other regressions, not reported, I 
included a time variable, and GDP2. The estimated coefficients were generally insignificant.  
37 Voth using aggregate series rejected the hypothesis of British exceptionalism.   11  
The third regression examines the impact of sectors, with manufacturing as the baseline 
case. Again, an F-test rejects the null of no added effect. As a whole, sector was less important 
than country, adding 8 percent to the explanatory power of regression 1, while country 
contributed 25 percent.
38 That said, the sectoral dummies conform to Rist’s insights. Compared to 
manufacturing, hours were longer in textiles and shorter in mining and construction. The service 
sector had the longest hours, but its products, like haircuts, were not traded; the length of the 
working day in this sector may have been the result of the loose industrial organization of firms 
and variable demand for their products. Similar differences between sectors and countries are also 
found when these variables are estimated together in regression 5.  
The German case illustrates the possibility of interaction between sectoral and country 
factors. To get work hours down, Bismarck used a policy of tariffs as an alternative to labor 
market regulation. “A normal workday could be established for Germany alone if Germany were 
surrounded by a Chinese wall and were economically self-sufficient.”
39 As elsewhere, German 
tariff policy impacted on sectors unevenly, and this likelihood can be handled by adding 
interaction variables.
40 But inspection of the error terms in the regressions with country variables 
indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity, resulting, perhaps, from different data collection 
methods across countries. Moreover, regressions 4 and 5 in Table 7 assume that the relation 
between sectors was the same in all countries, and all regressions assume that there are no country 
specific GDP effects. To get around these problems, Table 8 reports regression results for 
countries with more than 100 observations separately.
41 The specificity of the textile sector is 
apparent. In six countries textiles are different from manufacturing, and in eight from mining and 
construction. Clearly, across Old and New Worlds, holding income levels constant, the textile 
industry was under different pressures than found in other sectors where national routines 
remained the dominant influence on the workday. Germany was an exception.  It had a large 
textile industry, but tariff protection seems to have isolated it from pressures elsewhere, and 
worktime in this sector was no different than in manufacturing, iron and steel and services. The 
overall results are corroborated in Table 9 which breaks down the determinants of work hours by 
sector. Here I compare the determinants of hours in textiles and in mining and construction only, 
adding a time variable and an interaction term between time and GDP per capita. After 
controlling for country effects, the time coefficient is negative and significant for the textile 
                                                       
38 This is only an illustration of the explanatory power of country and sectoral factors because the regressors are not 
orthogonal. 
39 Bismarck responding in 1885 to demands by social reformers to improve working conditions, as cited in Follows, 
International Labor Organization, p. 91. 
40 The R2 of regression 5 of Table 7 with interaction terms is .533, indicating little effect from their addition.  
41 These regressions also included a constant and a binary variable for sex. The estimated coefficients are not reported 
and are available upon request.   12  
sector, while GDP is insignificant; in mining and construction the reverse holds.
42 My 
interpretation of these results is that in the competing-goods sector there was a common trend in 
work hours across countries, but national specific factors mattered more elsewhere.  
    
Textile workers of the world unite!  
 
  Gregory Clark has argued that productivity differences in the international textile industry 
before 1913 were substantial, an outcome that he speculated was due to “local effects” – by which 
he meant the culture of the indigenous labor force.
43 In this perspective, British producers had 
little to fear from foreign competition because long work hours elsewhere reflected low 
productivity. Clark may be right comparing Britain and India, but there is other evidence to 
suggest that he may have underestimated competition on the continent. D. A. Farnie, the doyen of 
cotton historians, wrote that British market penetration in Europe reached its peak by the early 
1880s.
44 The French, Belgian and, increasingly, Italian industries had successfully challenged 
British supremacy. Even the hard working Dutch had captured an increasing share of their home 
market.
45  
The explicit motivation behind the consular reports was to get a better understanding of 
the sources of competitive advantage of Britain’s major rivals. In 1870, the consular delegate in 
Belgium calculated that labor costs in Britain were competitive despite low wages and long hours 
of work on the continent. Still, the consular reports raised the specter that in the future Lancashire 
employers would be hardpressed to make further cuts to working hours, if Belgian levels failed to 
approach those in Britain.
46 By the 1890s, as continental hours remained stubbornly long, these 
concerns became the lighting rod of trade union activists who, fearing a race to the bottom, called 
for international standards that would lower work hours and raise working conditions on the 
continent. At home, Lancashire workers withdrew their support for more restrictions on the length 
of the workday. The upshot is that contemporaries perceived that the length of the workday was a 
potential source of comparative advantage.  
                                                       
42 F-tests for equality among countries give further support to the impression that international forces dominated 
national practices in the textile sector. For the textile sector, based on regression 1 in Table 9, the hypothesis that 
France = Germany = Italy cannot be rejected; for mining and construction, the hypothesis is rejected.  
43 Clark, “Why Isn’t the World Developed.”   
44 English yarn exports “reached successive peaks to Germany in 1872, to Italy in 1876, to Belgium in 1878, to 
Russia in 1879, and to France in 1883. The watershed in the history of the trade occurred in 1884 when the volume of 
yarn exports to both Europe and Asia reached its all-time maximum.” Farnie, English Cotton, p. 183. 
45 Van Zanden, “Industrialization,” p. 89. 
46 On the consular reports and international competition in textiles, see Bruland, “The European Textile Industry.”  
Other industries faced similar competitive pressures. Even as early as 1870, correspondents reported that the “way to 
combat competition from abroad in the tobacco and cigar industry…[was] for English working men to consent to a 
diminution of the[ir] high rate of wages...or [to] a proportionate increase in hours.” UK PP 1871 LXVIII, pp. 62-63.  13  
Tables 10 and 11 give trends in the basic data on textile hours and cotton consumption per 
capita to investigate contemporary concerns. Over the thirty-year period, the average decline was 
practically insignificant (Table 10 last line). Spanish and French hours actually increase, while for 
some of the leading industrializers, the decline in textile work hours was smaller than their 
general l averages. In Britain, textile hours declined by 4.7 percent, but average hours by 8.2 
percent.  In Italy, the decline of 5.1 percent in textiles was greater than the fall in the national 
average, and by the end of he period its workweek was identical to that of France, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland  The net result was both a decline and convergence of work 
hours, thereby explaining the negative time coefficient in Table 9.  The coefficient of variation for 
the entire sample of textile hours falls from 0.85 in 1870-79 to 0.69 in 1890-99.  Recall that there 
was no tendency for average hours to converge (Table 4). Table 12 gives raw cotton consumption 
per capita over the period. If contemporary concerns about the sources of competitive advantage 
were justified, textile hours would have been responsive to the relative importance of the 
industry. The Swiss and Italian cases stand out. The former ran down its industry as it sought to 
specialize in other export industries that were better suited to its level of development and factor 
endowments, and, as a result, its hours fell by more than the European average. The Italians 
promoted the expansion of textile production, consumption of cotton tripled and the decline in 
work hours much smaller. 
It may have been the case that other factors, besides international pressures, were 
responsible for the apparent convergence of worktime in textiles. Although I cannot reject this 
hypothesis, I can confirm whether textile hours were in fact a source of comparative advantage.  
Here I follow the procedure and specification set out by Dani Rodrik in his study of hours in the 
international textile industry in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
47 For a cross section of 
countries, Rodrik regressed the share of textile exports in total exports on a measure of the quality 
of the labor force and the labor-land ratio. He found, as trade theory would predict, that textile 
exports were larger in countries with less skilled workers and where the ratio of workers to land 
was high. Regression 1 in Table 12 shows that the relation between factor endowments and cotton 
textiles held as well in late nineteenth-century Europe. The dependent variable here is the annual 
change in per capita consumption of raw cotton, which is correlated with the available data on the 
change in countries’ export position.
48 Rodrik added the level of hours to this basic model and 
found that, across countries, the longer the workweek the greater the proportion of textile exports. 
Regression 2 using evidence on weekly hours shows that this was also the case in Europe one 
hundred year earlier. The coefficients have positive signs and are significant. The last regression 
adds a binary variable for labor legislation, equal to one for countries that had some minimal 
                                                       
47 Rodrik, “Labor Standards.” 
48 Robson, Cotton Industry, pp. 332-59.  14  
restriction on work hours.
49 The sign is negative, corroborating Rist’s claim that limiting work 
hours would have only damaged the expansion of France’s cotton textile sector. In all, these 
results give support to the view that, as today, long hours were a source of competitive advantage 
and not a sign failure or inefficiency as Clark asserts. The perception that Lancashire workers 
marched to Italian time had merit.  
 
                                                       
49 The countries and dates were: Britain and Switzerland, from 1870; Germany and France, from 1890. Source: 
Huberman and Lewchuk, “European Economic Integration.”  15  
 
Concluding observations: globalization then and now 
 
Pain in Spain: Workers bid adios to siesta 
 
With Spain under pressure to adjust to richer neighbor’s timetables, the ritual three-hour 
break for lunch and nap is disappearing. Spaniards say that they are working harder these 
days and sleeping less, feeling at once more prosperous and more fatigued….Because of 
more industrious work habits, according to one nationwide survey, regular siesta takers [now 
constitute only] 24 per cent of the population…The siesta is losing ground in other 
Mediterranean strongholds as Portugal, Italy and Greece also rush to catch their partners in 
the European Union. 
 
Los Angeles Times March 31, 2000 
 
 
Between 1870 and 1913, the transport revolution and population and capital movements 
brought Old and New Worlds closer together. Economic historians, led by Williamson, have 
investigated the effects of globalization on factor prices, which are believed to have converged 
across continents. The expansion of international exchanges also impacted on convergence within 
Europe. Sidney Pollard, for one, has written that after 1870, the European membership in the club 
of industrializers expanded.
50 But how deep was convergence? Did commodity and factor-of-
production flows erode differences in living standards – broadly defined to include wages and 
hours – between continents and national economies? 
This paper has sought to show that although globalization was extensive, convergence was 
limited. To begin, prevailing interpretations of movements in productivity and income stand to be 
corrected because they are based on Maddison’s data set on worktime which is seriously flawed. 
New international evidence demonstrates that work hours and days varied between countries, as 
well as between continents. Across the sample, hours generally did decline with income, a 
response that should have led countries to look more and more alike. This was not evident and not 
simply because countries moved in the same direction, albeit at different rhythms. Some, like the 
Netherlands, moved entirely in a different direction. National work routines persisted in the 
period, while other countries differed because of varying degrees of restrictions on the workday. 
Sectoral factors contributed as well to trends in international worktime. With rising levels of 
income, hours across countries should have exhibited a race to the top. But in the competing-
goods industries, like textiles, the opposite took hold. Because hours were a source of competitive 
advantage, even the British had to keep in time with the Italians. As a result of the mix of 
economic, national and sectoral factors, trends in worktime did not behave as factor prices did.  
                                                       
50 Pollard, Peaceful Conquest.  16  
These findings cast some light on opposing views on the effect of economic integration on 
worktime. One view is that as global forces spread and accentuate, combined with the process of 
harmonization embedded in projects like the European Union, the workday will tend to look alike 
across countries, and even Spanish workers will lose their rest time. The other is that there are 
many margins of adjustment in labor markets, and because the non-tradable sector remains 
important, pressures on labor costs need not translate into convergence of worktime.
51 My results 
give support to both positions, but the balance tilts toward the claim that national work routines 
can be preserved. The Swiss case exemplifies this possibility. The country remained open 
throughout the late nineteenth century and at the same time introduced progressive labor 
legislation reducing the length of the workday. It did so only because it moved out of textile 
manufacture. In countries that were less flexible, workers’ leisure time was compressed. Where 
policy is farsighted, workers can indeed enjoy the benefits of globalization and keep their siesta 
too. 
 
                                                       
51 Ehrenberg, Labor Markets, provides a summary of the debate.  17  
APPENDIX 
 
A1. The data source 
 
In its 15th Annual Report, the US Bureau of Labor gathered data on factory condition across 
countries, including the weekly hours and earnings of female and male workers, and occasionally 
of the size of firm. The unit of observation was occupation (the average hour worked by a cotton 
spinner in a particular firm and year). Table A1 gives the breakdown of the 46 occupations by 
sector. 
 
A2. The US data 
 
In its report, the Bureau of Labor appears to have assembled all previous published census 
returns, and state and federal bulletins and reports on work hours. Rosenbloom, and others have 
used these earlier studies, and my findings closely resemble their results.
52  
 
A3. Worker welfare 
 
It is well known that GDP per capita underestimates workers’ welfare because it does not include 
gains to workers owing to increased leisure time. Fewer hours worked by the employed implies 
greater leisure, which presumably adds to workers’ utility. This is not true for the unemployed or 
for those working fewer hours than they would like to. Still, standard neo-classical analysis 
suggests that adults in countries with fewer hours worked will be better off relative to those in 
countries with more hours worked at the same level of GDP per capita. This implies that units 
like Britain were in fact relatively better off after controlling for hours worked. To get an idea of 
how much better, I follow a standard approach and measure leisure-adjusted income in period t as 
the sum of income in period t and the difference in hours worked between t and the base year 0, 
valued at the wage rate in t.
53 Because it is unclear if existing wage series take into account hour 
changes, I use GDP per capita.
54 For Belgium, Table A3, reports GDP per capita of $3,579 in 
1899 and a decrease of 119.9 hours per person between 1870 and 1899. Assume, following 
N.F.R. Crafts, that labor’s share of income was 70 percent; the gain in leisure is 0.7 x 2.72 per 
hour (GDP/per hour worked in 1899) x 119.9 = $227. Thus, leisure-adjusted GDP per capita is 
$3,806 (last column of the table). Britain’s position does improve relative to the European 
average. The welfare of Swiss and Belgian workers is now greater than that of the Dutch, and the 
                                                       
52 In Table A2, I have organized the US data by region, following the division of states in Rosenbloom, “Was There a 
National Labor Market,” p. 653. 
53 I have followed the procedure set out in Beckerman, “Comparative Growth Rates,” and Crafts, “Human 
Development Index.” See, Bell and Freeman, “Americans and Germans,” for similar calculations for the period after 
1945 
54 Williamson (“Evolution of Global Labor Markets”) sought to construct a series of real wages for comparable 
periods of work time, but owing to data limitations he was not completely successful.  Of the European wage 
observations in the Williamson data set for the period between 1850 and 1914, nine percent reflect earnings per hour, 
23 percent daily earnings, 16 percent weekly earnings and 11 percent monthly or annual earnings; 40 percent of all 
observations are unspecified. For example, the wage series for Sweden is inferred from an annual index. It is not 
evident to what extent the index captures changes in work hours. O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and 
History, found that convergence in GDP per capita generally understates real wage convergence. 
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gap between German and French workers is twice as large when using leisure-adjusted GDP. 
There is little evidence of convergence. While the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita 
(uncorrected) falls from 1870 to 1899, there is no change in dispersion when comparing 1870 




Maddison assumed uniform weekly work hours across the New and Old Word to calculate GDP 
per hour worked, his preferred measure of productivity. In Table A4, I present Maddison’s figures 
for 1870 and 1900, along with my new estimates for 1870, 1899, and 1913 based on the evidence 
from the report. (The 1913 estimate assumes 1899 work hours.). All calculations use the same 
GDP values and labor force numbers. For the entire sample, average productivity levels and 
changes over time are about the same comparing Maddison and the revised measure, but the 
relative positions of the countries differ. Using the new work hour estimates, British productivity 
levels in the last three decades of the century were higher, by about 8 percent in 1899, and while 
Maddison’s figures indicate that leadership passed to the US at the turn of the century, the revised 
estimates still give Britain the advantage at this date. The gap between Britain and its continental 
rivals (the Old World average) actually increased between 1870 and 1899. There are differences 
in productivity changes as well. Compared to Maddison, the new estimates show stronger 
productivity growth in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Switzerland, slightly poorer 
performances in Canada, Italy, Sweden and the US, and much poorer performances in France and 
the Netherlands. With regard to convergence, Maddison’s numbers show a closing of the 
productivity gap between Old and New World between 1870 and 1900; the corrected estimates 
show that the gap actually widened. 
  19  
TABLE 1 
 
 MADDISON’S ESTIMATES OF WORKTIME, 1870-1913 
 
 
Hours of work per week  Weeks of work  Annual hours of work 
 
1870  1900  1913 1870 1913 1870 1900 1913 
Austria  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.3 2935  2679  2580 
Belgium  63  56.3  53.8 51.0 50.0 2945  2707  2605 
Denmark  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.3 2945  2688  2588 
Finland  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.2 2945  2688  2588 
France  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.3 2945  2688  2588 
Germany  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.3 2941  2684  2584 
Great  Britain  63  56.3  53.8 51.0 50.0 2984  2725  2624 
Italy  63  56.3  53.8 49.3 48.3 2886  2634  2536 
Netherlands  63  56.3  53.8 51.0 50.0 2964  2707  2588 
Norway  63  56.3  53.8 50.3 49.3 2945  2688  2605 
Sweden  63  56.3  53.8 50.2 49.2 2945  2688  2588 
Switzerland  63  56.3  53.8 51.0 50.0 2984  2725  2624 
Australia  63  56.3  53.8 50.7 49.7 2945  2688  2588 
Canada  63  56.3  53.8 50.7 49.7 2964  2707  2605 
United  States  63  56.3  53.8 50.7 49.7 2964  2707  2605 
Europe  63  56.3  53.8 50.4 49.4  2947.0  2691.8  2591.5 
New  World  63  56.3  53.8 50.7 49.7  2957.7  2700.7  2599.3 
 
Sources: Maddison, Economic Growth, Phases of Development, Monitoring, World Economy  20  
TABLE 2 
 
WORKTIME AROUND THE WORLD 
 
 
 Work  hours 
per day  
Work year 
(days) 
Austria 12  289 
308 (1913) 
Belgium   13  284 
292 (1892) 
Brazil 10   
Canada 10  305 
Chile  298 
Denmark 12  310 
Ecuador 9   
Finland 11  288 
France 12  264 
293 (1887) 
Germany 12   
Great Britain  10  299 
Greece 12  170 
Italy 11  270 
290 (1892) 
Lebanon 13   
Morocco 10   
Netherlands 13  310 
Norway 13   
Poland   230  (1890) 
Portugual 12  301 
Puerto Rico  10   
Russia 12.5  288 
Spain 11.5 282 
Sweden 13  305 
Switzerland 13  310 
United States  10.5  309 
 
Note: All figures are for 1870 except where indicated. 
 
Sources: PP 1870 LXVI, PP 1871 LXVIII, PP 1872 LXIII, PP 1893-94 XXXIX, PP 1899 XCII. TABLE 3   
 
AVERAGE HOURS OF WORK PER WEEK, 1870-1899 





Hours of work per week 
 All  Men  Women  Mining and 
construction  Iron and steel  Textile  Manufacturing  Service 
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Notes: Some observations did not specify the sex of workers. As a result, the total of identified men and female workers does not equal the number of 
observations. The breakdown of the sample in percentage is in square brackets. The standard deviation of the country totals is in italics.  
 
Source: See text. 
 TABLE 4 
WORK HOURS: FIVE YEAR AVERAGES,1870-1889 
(Number of observations) 
[percentage] 
 








































































































































































































  Notes and source: See text. TABLE  5  
ANNUAL WORKHOURS, 1870-1899 [s.d.] 
 
  Annual hours 
 
Hours per 
week  Days per year  Days absent  Weeks per 
year  1890-1899 1870  1899  1998 
Belgium  67.7  292  5.5  47.8 3233 3295 3023 1568 
Denmark  62.0  300  5.3  49.1 3045 3291 2898 1664 
France  65.2  293  6.2  47.8 3117 3069 3083 1503 
Germany  65.4  295  8.4  47.8 3124 3191 2823 1523 
Great Britain  55.1  299  8.4  48.4 2669 2743 2519 1489 
Ireland  57.3  300  6.8  48.9 2800 2888 2634 1657 
Italy  64.3  290  5.5  47.4 3049 3068 3049 1506 
Netherlands  65.3  310  6.8  50.5 3300 3285 3421 1389 
Spain  64.8  282  6.8  45.9 2972 2981 2936 1908 
Sweden  68.2  300  5.9  49.0 3343 3343 3343 1582 
Switzerland  65.1  300  6.8  48.9 3181 3403 2956 1595 
Australia  49.6  305  6.8  49.7 2465 2592 2386 1641 
Canada  59.7  305  6.8  49.7 2697 2941 2992 1663 

































Notes and sources: Days absent from US Department of Labor, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, and Workmen’s Compensation Laws. Countries not identified were 
given the average of known values, 6.8 days. All other values from Table 3 and 4.   
TABLE 6 
 
ANNUAL WORKTIME AND GDP  
 
 






































2  0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 
F  3.77 2.90 2.43 2.08 
N  27 21 27 21 
 
Notes: GDPgap is the difference in income per head from British levels. t statistics in parentheses. 
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TABLE 7   
DETERMINANTS OF WORKING HOURS 
 
  Dependent variable: log weekly hours 



































































Iron and steel 















2  0.29 0.26 0.41 0.35 0.48 
F 2877.16  1175.85  329.97  581.79  342.20 
N  7225 6600 6600 6600 6600 
 
Notes: All regressions include a constant term and binary variable for sex of worker. The base case is a male worker 
in manufacturing in Great Britain. t statistics in parentheses. TABLE 8 
 
DETERMINANTS OF WORKING HOURS BY COUNTRY 
 
Country  GDP per capita  Mining and 
construction 































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is weekly working hours. The base case is a male worker in manufacturing.  All regressions include a constant term and binary variable 




DETERMINANTS OF WORKING HOURS BY SECTOR 
 
Dependent variable: log weekly hours 


































































2 0.59  0.52 
F 125.84  125.54 
N 1396  1854 
 
Notes: All regressions include a binary variable for sex of worker. t statistics in parentheses.  29  
TABLE 10 
ANNUAL HOURS BY COUNTRY AND BY DECADE: TEXTILES 
(Number of observations) 
[s.d.] 







Denmark  67.0 (1)  60.0 (1)  63.0 (1) 




































Spain  60.0 (1)  64.1 (10)  64.0 (6) 
Sweden 66.0  (4)     
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TABLE 11 
 
RAW COTTON CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA, 1870-1899 
(tons per 1000 inhabitants) 
[s.d] 
 
  1870-79 1880-89 1890-99 
Belgium   4.25  4.04  5.34 
France 2.29  2.85  4.11 
Germany 2.80  2.39  5.19 
Italy 0.91  2.39  3.44 
Netherlands 2.48  2.97  3.13 
Spain 2.02  2.79  3.62 
Sweden 1.89  2.39  3.16 
Switzerland 11.88  8.68  8.42 
United Kingdom  24.11  25.48  25.60 
Europe 5.85  [7.6] 6.00  [7.6] 6.89  [7.2] 
 
Source: Population and raw cotton consumption – Mitchell, Historical Statistics.   31  
TABLE 12 
 
DETERMINANTS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN TEXTILES 
 
Dependant variable: consumption (per capita) of cotton    























Legislation     -0.263 
(-11.72) 
R
2  0.07 0.22 0.31 
F 38.19  99.14  118.46 
N  1042 1042 1042 
 
Note:  Labor in labor-land is population squared. Legislation is a binary variable equal to one if minimal restrictions 
on worktime enacted. Countries and dates - Britain and Switzerland, from 1870; Germany and France, from 1890. 
Countries dummies included but not reported. t statistics in parentheses. 
 
Sources: Illiteracy and land – Foreman-Peck and Lains, “European Economic Development”; labor – Mitchell, 
Historical Statistics; legislation – Huberman and Lewchuk, “European Economic Integration.” 
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TABLE A1 
 




























































Watchmen TABLE A2 
 
WORK HOURS IN THE UNITED STATES 




Hours of work per week 
 All  Mining and 
construction  Iron and steel  Textile  Manufacturing  Services 

































































































[11.6] TABLE A3 
 
GDP PER WORKER HOUR: MADDISON AND REVISED ESTIMATES 
[s.d.] 
 
  Maddison New 
  1870 1900 1913 1870 1900 1913 
Belgium 2.17 3.02 3.68 1.95 2.70 3.32 
Denmark 1.57 2.34 3.58 1.40 2.18 3.38 
France  1.38 2.28 2.88 1.32 1.98 2.43 
Germany 1.55 2.30 3.03 1.38 2.15 2.50 
Italy  1.05 1.35 2.13 0.99 1.17 1.78 
Netherlands  2.43 3.28 4.11 2.19 2.60 3.35 
Spain  1.22 1.40 2.00 1.21 1.43 2.06 
Sweden  1.22 2.03 2.58 1.08 1.63 2.00 
Switzerland  1.53 2.49 3.30 1.34 2.29 3.18 
United 
Kingdom 
2.55 3.63 4.31 2.78 3.92 4.69 
Australia 3.48 3.69 5.48 3.77 4.35 5.99 
Canada  1.71 2.23 4.45 1.63 2.02 3.78 
United 
States 
2.25 3.66 5.12 2.22 3.54 4.95 
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TABLE A4 
 
GDP ADJUSTED FOR LEISURE 
[s.d.] 
 
  Work hours per person  GDP per capita 
  1870 1899 1870 1899  Leisure 
adjusted 
Belgium 1450.7  1330.9  2640  3579  3806 
Denmark 1389.8  1223.9  2008 2840 3093 
France 1433.6  1440.3  2059  2884  2875 
Germany 1488.0  1316.5  1913 3049 3307 
Italy 1452.9  1443.9  1467  1663  1670 
Netherlands 1250.2  1302.1  2640  3703  3609 
Spain 1132.9  1115.5  1376  2040  2057 
Sweden 1547.5  1547.4  1664  2491  2491 
Switzerland 1676.9  1456.8  2172  3463  3816 
United 
Kingdom 
1195.0 1097.0  3263  4670  4939 
Australia 1005.7  925.7  3801 4113 4357 
Canada 1128.9  1148.5  1620  2649  2621 
United States  1197.1  1111.7  2457  4056  4268 



































































Note: The line represents the regression of annual work hours = 3363 - 0.137GDP per capita. The relevant t statistic 
is -2.604; R
2 = .21; F = 6.783 (p = .015) 
 
Sources: GDP per capita - Maddison, Monitoring; work hours - Table 5.   
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